UH-1F Eglin AFB 1966   UH-1F DMAFB, AZ 1967   UH-1F Malmstrom AFB 1967   UH-1F Eglin AFB 1969   UH-1F Edwards AFB 1971   UH-1F Ellisworth AFB 1971   UH-1N FT. Bragg 1973   HH-1H Hill AFB 1974   UH-1F F.E. Warren 1975   UH-1F Ellsworth AFB 1982   UH-1F Whiteman AFB 1982   UH-1N Bahamas 1984   UH-1 Ellsworth AFB 1986   UH-1N Edwards-Jan-1991   UH-1N Edwards-Oct-1991   UH-1N Kirtland AFB 1996   UH-1N 1998   UH-1N F.E. Warren AFB 1999   UH-1N Kirtland AFB 2002   TH-lH Ft. Rucker 2009   UH-1N Malmstrom AFB 2010   UH-1N Kirtland AFB 2011   UH-1N Minot AFB 2013   CH-3C Malmstrom AFB 1965   CH-3C Sheppard AFB Mar. 1967   CH-3 Sheppard AFB Nov. 1967   CH-3E Midair in Laos 1970   HH-3E Korea 1973   HH-3E Elmendorf AFB 1974   HH-3E Iceland 1979   CH-3E Patrick AFB, 1984   HH-3E Osan 1984   HH-3E 29-Palms 1988   HH-3E Kadena 1989   CH-3E DMAFB 1989   H-5G Ladd AFB 1951   H-5H Maxwell AFB 1953   H-5 New York 1958   H-13G Niagara Falls 1955   H-13 Bryan AFB, TX 1957   H-19A San Marcos 1952   H-19A O'Neill, NB. 1953   H-19B Alexandria, LA. 1954   H-19B Austria 1954   H-19B France 1954   H-19B Korea 1954   H-19B March AFB 1954   H-19B Rhine Main AB 1955   H-19B Eglin AFB 1955   H-19 Skaneateles Lake, NY 1956   H-19 Ashiya Japan 1957   H-19 Edwards AFB 1957   H-19 Niagra Falls 1959   H-19 Sheppard   H-19B Loring AFB 1960   H-19 Beal AFB 1963   H-19 Larson AFB 1963   H-19 Saigon, RVN 1964   YH-21 Thule AB 1953   H-21 Goose Bay 1954   H-21A San Marcos TX 1955   H-21B Tennesse 1955   H-21 San Diego, CA 1956   H-21 Alaska 1957   H-21 Goose Bay 1958.   SH-21 Greenland 1958   H-21 Elmendorf AFB 1958   H-21 Dugway Proving Grnd. 1958   H-21 Goose Bay 1959   H-21 Greenland 1959   CH-21B Otis AFB 1959   H-21 Indian Springs AAF 1961   H-21 Luke AFB 1961   H-23B Moody AFB 1953   H-43A James Connally AFB 1959   H-43B Loring AFB 1961   H-43B Westover AFB 1961   HH-43B MacDill AFB, FL 1964   HH-43B Stead AFB 1965   HH-43B Clark AB, PI 1966   H-43 Sheppard AFC, TX 1966   HH-43B Phan Rang 1968   HH-43B MacDill AFB 1969   HH-43B Hill AFB 1973   HH-53C Eglin AFB 1969   CH-53C Germany 1975   CH-53C Germany 1976   HH-53C Woodbridge 1977   HH-53C Kadena AB 1979   HH-53B Kirtland AFB 1981   HH-53C Kirtland AFB 1982   MH-53 Philippines 1984   CH-53C Pope AFB 1984   HH-53C Hickam AFB, HI 1985   HH-53C Hill AFB 1986   HH-53H Nellis AFB 1986   MH-53J Korea 1995   HH-53B Vance AFB 1996   HH-53B Cherry Point 1998   MH-53J Ft. Bragg 1999   MH-53M RAF Mildenhall 2000   MH-53 Durango CO 2002   MH-53M USNS Kanawha 2002   MH-53M Afghanistan 2003   MH-53M FOL Hurlburt Fld 2003   MH-53M Kuwait 2003   MH-53M Hurlburt Fld. 2007   UH-60A Pope AFB 1987   HH-60G New York 1991   MH-60G Antigua 1991   HH-60G Great Salt Lake 1992   HH-60G Davis-Monthan AFB 1994   HH-60G Korea 1994   HH-60G Indian Springs 1998   HH-60G Al Jabar AB 1999   HH-60G Avon Park 2001   HH-60G Mt. Hood 2002   HH-60G Afghanistan 2002   HH-60G Afghanistan 2003   HH-60G Afghanistan 2004   HH-60G Angel Fire, NM 2005   HH-60G Kandahar 2007   HH-60G Afghanistan 2009   HH-60G Okinawa 2013   HH-60G Lakenheath 2014   HH-60G Lakenheath 2014 1   HH-60G Lakenheath 2014 2   Ellsworth AFB 1955   Hawaii crash 1963   Patuxent River NAS 1960   Randolph AFB 1957   Spokane River, WA 1959   Tyndall AFB 1961   Wright-Patterson 1956   Spokane River 1972  


CH-3C 63-9680

April 30, 1965 Crash 


The Montana Standard (Butte, Montana)

Saturday May 1, 1965, page 1


12 Men Burned In Copter Crash

Near Lewistown, MT.


LEWISTOWN (AP) - An Air Force helicopter crashed and exploded into flames moments after takeoff Friday evening (April 30, 1965), burning the 12 men aboard.

 

None of the men, four crew men and eight passengers, was believed seriously injured. They were treated at a Lewistown hospital and the Air Force radar station north of Lewistown.

 

The craft was leaving a central Montana Minuteman Missile launch site.

 

An Air Force spokesman at Malmstrom Air Force Base near Great Falls, home base for the helicopter, said the craft apparently lost power on takeoff and went out of control after clipping a radio antenna at the missile site, about 10 miles north of Lewistown.

 

The crash was under investigation.

 

A rancher, William Kona, said the crash was less than a half-mile from his home and he wasn't allowed to go near the crash scene. "They've got enough soldiers around here to float a battleship," he said.

 

A neighbor, Jack Maiden, said he watched the craft come down and it seemed to him that it exploded only moments after it hit the ground.



Requiem for a Chopper


Aerospace Safety Magazine Nov. 1965

(Provided by Bevon R. Dowell)


"A stark tale of tragedy unfolds. The heavy chopper started to lift off the graveled surface, proceeded toward the embankment at the right, faltered, moved to the left, struck the fence, crashed into the ground short of the power lines, settled on its side and caught fire.

 

The cabin door was on top. Occupants unlatched it. They could not get the door open. Melted nylon began dripping from straps inside the cabin. One of the pilots crawled through a cockpit window broken out in the crash. He ran around and pulled the cabin door free. All crewmembers and passengers escaped.

 

The board reported that the primary cause factor for this accident could not be unconditionally determined due to the extensive fire damage following the accident. They reported, however, that the most probable cause was pilot factor, in that the loss of aerodynamic lift caused by a reduction of rotor RPM, probably induced by improper pilot technique, was indicated. They reasoned that reduction of rotor RPM was probably caused by either inattention of the pilot to his power indicating instruments and subsequent over demand upon the rotor due to excessive use of collective pitch, or to a rapid application of pitch which, in effect, called for more power than the turbines were capable of producing. In either case, the aircraft would be placed behind the power curve and into a flight condition from which it was impossible for the instructor to make a safe recovery.

 

The board recommended that all pilots, flying this type helicopter be briefed that, under maximum performance operation, optimum pilot and aircraft performance is necessary, and that the use of engine instruments is essential for establishing power settings.


ADDITIONAL FINDINGS


Although, in the opinion of the board, the following findings did not contribute to the accident, they included them in their final report:

 

Obstruction or terrain hazards that make such areas as this incompatible with approach or landing safety for this type helicopter are not taken into consideration. The only criteria is that the transverse and longitudinal slope will not exceed four per cent. They suggest such criteria be reviewed and the necessity of including terrain and obstruction clearance be considered.

 

Presently, cleaning fuel filters is left up to individual opinion during even numbered phase inspections.

 

The present checklist does not provide the pilot with a takeoff checklist for intermediate stops. They recommend that the checklist be revised to provide such a section.

 

After impact passenger efforts to evacuate the burning aircraft were frustrated due to inability to reach the emergency release handle or open the door after actuating the normal opening handle of the passenger/cargo door. The recommend that consideration be given to either relocating the emergency release, where passengers can get at it regardless of the position of the fuselage, or providing additional emergency release devices.

 

Efforts of the passengers to get out of the fuselage and escape from the fire by using the pop-out windows and emergency escape hatches were foiled because nylon seat backs covered these exits. The board suggested that leaving strategic areas of egress uncovered by seat back webbing during passenger carrying operations be evaluated.

 

Several passengers received third degree burns during escape from the aircraft due to contact with molten fragments of nylon from the seats and interior materials. It was suggested that an evaluation be made relative to replacing nylon materials with a material less hazardous to personnel in a fire environment.

 

Work has been done on compressor stator blades, but documentation of this work was not made in the 781-A, nor was the required inspection performed or documented. Necessity for an operational check was known, but was not entered in the 781. On this matter the board recommended proper recording of all aircraft discrepancies, subsequent maintenance to clear such discrepancies and the necessity of inspection by a qualified inspector.

 

Tear down reports failed to disclose materiel cause factors."



            



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"HELICOPTERS" - THE ONLY WAY TO FLY


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